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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a free trade agreement among twelve 
Pacific Rim countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and 
Vietnam.1  Each of these countries is also a signatory of the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which currently 
provides the international intellectual property standards.2  Despite failing to 
reach an agreement during the negotiations in July 2015,3 the countries met 
again in September 2015 to continue efforts to finalize the treaty.4  On October 
5, 2015, the twelve countries announced that the treaty had been finalized, 
although the final version of the treaty was not signed at that time.5  After the 
TPP was finalized, the United States Trade Representative released the final text 
of the Intellectual Property Chapter.6 
The TPP contains a wide range of provisions on traditional trade topics, 
such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property, and dispute settlement, 
and on a number of non-traditional trade topics, such as labor, 
telecommunications, and e-commerce.7  The wide variety of topics the treaty 
addresses and the non-transparent manner in which negotiations have been 
conducted have fueled the controversy surrounding the treaty.8  
                                                                                                                  
 1 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OVERVIEW OF THE TRANS 
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2009), https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP. 
 2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, CONTRACTING PARTIES/SIGNATORIES: 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS 
AGREEMENT), http://www.wipo.int/wipo/ex/on/other_treaties/parties/jsp?treaty_id=231&gro 
ve-id=22 (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) [hereinafter WIPO]. 
 3 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., JOINT STATEMENT BY TPP MINISTERS (July 2015). 
 4 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., UNITED STATES TO HOST TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
TRADE MINISTERS’ MEETING IN ATLANTA (Sept. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offic 
es/press-releases/2015/September/United-States-host-trans-pacific. 
 5 Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal is Reached but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-
trade-deal-is-reached.html. 
 6 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Ch. 18, drafted Oct. 5, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/def 
ault/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf [hereinafter TPP]. 
 7 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., TPP ISSUE-BY-ISSUE INFORMATION CENTER, https://ustr. 
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-issue-issue-negotiati 
ng-objectives (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
 8 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Job Loss, Lower Wages, and Higher Drug Prices, PUBLIC 
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/TPP (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (stating that the TPP is not a 
“free trade” agreement as it only specifically addresses trade issues in five of the twenty-nine draft 
chapters). 
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Despite the controversy surrounding the TPP, this agreement follows other 
significant trade agreements in covering intellectual property.  The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was implemented in 1994, 
was an agreement among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.9  The NAFTA 
provisions provided that patents be made available “for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that such inventions 
are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”10  
Additionally, NAFTA sought to protect trade by ensuring that intellectual 
property rights, including patent protections, were not enforced so as to offer 
protection to domestic products.11  As a result, the United States had to permit 
reliance on activities occurring in other NAFTA countries to prove a date of 
invention and adopt a twenty-year patent term.12  Since the implementation of 
NAFTA, numerous trade agreements between the United States and other 
countries have implemented similar intellectual property provisions.13 
Additionally, the United States entered into TRIPS as part of the Uruguay 
Rounds Agreement in 1994, which was finalized through the Marrakesh 
Agreement and established the World Trade Organization (WTO).14  TRIPS is 
the most significant step taken to date towards the creation of a uniform system 
of intellectual property rights and enforcement.  For patents, TRIPS provides 
that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.”15  TRIPS also provides 
an international mechanism for resolving disputes that arise regarding 
intellectual property rights.  The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO 
hears cases arising under TRIPS and these cases are subjected to the procedures 
                                                                                                                  
 9 North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1709:1, Dec. 17 1992, 107 Stat. 2061 [hereinafter 
NAFTA]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 NAFTA: The First Major International Trade Agreement to Protect IP Rights, MILLER CANFIELD, 
http://www.millercanfield.com/media/article/200162_IP%20Rights.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 
2016). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Korea Free Trade Agreement, ch. 18, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 
(note to statute confirming the United States and Korean Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act).  
 14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 407 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 15 Id. art. 27:1. 
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established under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).16  Additionally, 
TRIPS provides the foundation for the TPP’s Intellectual Property Chapter.17 
In Part II, this Note will examine the domestic patent protections in the 
United States and the international patent provisions established under TRIPS 
and how the DSB has resolved conflicts that arise under TRIPS’ patent 
provisions.  In Part III, this Note will evaluate how the TPP’s patent provisions 
fit within the framework established by NAFTA and TRIPS.  To do so, this 
Note will explore any changes to existing United States patent provisions that 
might occur through the adoption of the TPP.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note 
will examine the economic benefits that will accrue to the United States through 
the adoption of the patent provisions in the TPP.  Additionally, this Note will 
explain why the accrual of economic benefits outweighs the public health 
concerns at the center of the controversy surrounding the TPP patent 
provisions.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
The intellectual property provisions of the TPP will have to fit into the 
existing framework provided for patents in TRIPS, to which the United States 
Code (U.S.C.) already conforms.  The U.S.C. provides the existing domestic 
framework for patent protection and enforcement, including potential remedies.  
Meanwhile, TRIPS provides the international framework for patent protection 
and enforcement.  
A.  PATENTABLE MATERIAL UNDER THE UNITED STATES’ DOMESTIC PATENT 
PROVISIONS 
The United States has enacted statutes to determine a product’s 
patentability.  For example, 35 U.S.C. § 101 states that “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof” is patentable.18  Under this standard, the United 
States allows inventors patent new products, processes, and novel 
improvements of existing goods.  The courts in the United States have 
                                                                                                                  
 16 Id. art. 64:1; see generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (the DSU permits DSB panels and the appellate 
body to hear disputes arising under TRIPS). 
 17 See, e.g., TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.1 (definition of “intellectual property” relies on concepts 
covered under TRIPS). 
 18 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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interpreted the utility requirement to require merely that a purported invention 
have some beneficial use.19  Additionally, the United States only requires that an 
inventor set forth the best mode of application when applying for a patent.20  
This allows inventors to specify one use of a product when applying for a 
patent while also having the option to renew the product when a new use for 
the product is discovered.  This option allows inventors to extend their 
exclusive use of a product through a practice known as “evergreening.”21  
Evergreening is a popular practice for pharmaceutical companies, which extend 
the effective life of their patent, often well beyond the statutory period of 
twenty years, to prevent cheaper generic drugs from entering the market.22 
Furthermore, under the utility prong of analysis, the Supreme Court has held 
that the invention must have an actual function at the time the inventor files for 
the patent to fulfill the utility requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 101.23  The fact that an 
invention may have a possible use does not make the invention patentable.  If 
there is no definitive use for the invention when the inventor files for the 
patent, the patent will be rejected.24 
Once an inventor has shown a product’s utility, he must still demonstrate 
the invention’s novelty.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a), a person will be granted a 
patent unless “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication (or in public use), on sale, or otherwise available to the public 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”25  While the prior 
patent or description is applicable to actions taken in the United States and 
abroad, the public use, availability to the public, and sale of a prior invention 
exclusions require that the actions be taken only in the United States.26  Under 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), there is a presumption that an invention is novel.27  While 
there are exceptions to the rule established in 35 U.S.C. § 102,28 these 
                                                                                                                  
 19 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966) (citing the utility requirements first 
set forth in Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)).  
 20 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 21 Burcu Kilic, What is Patentable Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership? An Analysis of the Free Trade 
Agreement’s Patentability Provisions from a Public Health Perspective, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 2–3 
(2015). 
 22 Id. at 4–5.  
 23 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33. 
 24 Id. 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).  
 26 Id. § 102(a)–(b). 
 27 Id. § 102(a). 
 28 See generally id. § 102(b) (enumerating exceptions to the prior art requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)).  
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exceptions address when an invention should be granted a patent even when 
prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
Additionally, the United States requires that an invention be of a non-
obvious subject matter.   Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 states that “[a] patent for a 
claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date.”29  This section 
requires that the subject matter of the claimed invention must be obvious to a 
person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.30  The Supreme Court has held 
that under 35 U.S.C. § 103, four factors must be used to evaluate the 
obviousness, or lack thereof, of a claimed invention: (1) the level of ordinary 
skill in the art; (2) scope and content of the prior art; (3) differences between 
the claimed invention and the prior art, and; (4) secondary considerations.31  
Courts have determined the level of ordinary skill in the art by evaluating the 
qualifications of the inventor, the education level of a typical worker in the art, 
how quickly new innovations arise in the art, and the sophistication of the 
technology used in the art.32  Furthermore, courts have evaluated the scope and 
content of prior art by examining 35 U.S.C. § 102 to determine what qualifies as 
prior art.33  The definition of prior art is restrained by requiring that invention 
and the prior art must fall within the same art or another art which is reasonably 
pertinent to the invention to prevent an invention from being patentable.34  
Additionally, courts have found that there must be some appreciable difference 
between the prior art and the claimed invention; otherwise, the claimed 
invention would be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102.35  Finally, the courts evaluate 
a number of secondary considerations, including objective indicia of non-
obviousness, such as the commercial success of the prior art, the failure of 
others to solve the problem the invention addresses, and the need for the 
invention.36  
                                                                                                                  
 29 Id. § 103. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. at 15. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (finding that an 
invention which is not sufficiently different from the prior art fails under both the novelty and 
non-obvious tests).  
 36 Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503–04 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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B.  RIGHTS CONFERRED TO PATENT HOLDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States patent statutory framework confers certain rights upon 
patent holders.  For a patented product, no party may make, use, offer for sale, 
sell, or import the product within the United States without the patent holder’s 
consent.37 Additionally, for any patented process, no party may use, offer for 
sale, sell, or import the process within the United States.38  These prohibitions, 
combined with enforcement mechanisms, allow patent holders to exercise a 
near monopoly on the market for their invention for the twenty years the patent 
remains in effect. 
C.  POTENTIAL REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT 
In the United States, the remedies for a patent infringement claim lie in civil 
court, not criminal court.39  A party is found to have infringed upon a patent 
when they make, use, offer to sell, or sell any patented invention without the 
patent owner’s permission.40  Additionally, the United States also prohibits the 
sale or importation of any component of a patented invention that constitutes a 
material aspect of the invention.41  If the court determines that a party has 
violated 35 U.S.C. § 271, then a number of remedies are available to the 
complaining party. 
The United States civil enforcement of patents allows the recovery of many 
different forms of damages.  First, injured parties can seek injunctive relief to 
prevent continued infringement.42  If a party does not wish to seek injunctive 
relief, the courts can also award compensatory damages to the injured party.43  
Compensatory damages must not be less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
of the invention, including costs and interest, as determined by the court.44  
Finally, the courts can award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
exceptional circumstances.45  A potential amendment to this section is before 
Congress, which would change the requirement for attorney fees from 
exceptional circumstances to bringing or contesting an action in a manner that 
                                                                                                                  
 37 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 38 Id. § 154(d)(1)(A)(ii).  
 39 Id. § 281. 
 40 Id. § 271(a).  
 41 Id. § 271(c). 
 42 Id. § 283.  
 43 Id. § 284.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. § 285.  
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is not objectively reasonable.46  This amendment would make the award of 
attorney fees more readily available.47 
D.  PATENTABILITY PROVISIONS UNDER TRIPS AND NAFTA 
TRIPS, signed in 1994, is a multilateral agreement creating uniform, 
minimum requirements for the patentability of inventions.48  As of 2015, TRIPS 
had 161 contracting parties.49  Furthermore, TRIPS provides a similar 
framework for the patentability of a product as that found in United States 
statutes. 
Article 27 of TRIPS details the patentable subject matter under the 
agreement.  This article states that “patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”50  
Footnote 5 to the agreement states that the phrase “inventive step” is 
synonymous with a non-obvious use, while the phrase “capable of industrial 
application” is synonymous with useful.51  Additionally, Article 33 provides for 
a twenty year patent term.52  However, Article 27 does not allow the renewal of 
a patent when a new use of an existing product is discovered, thereby 
preventing inventors from undertaking evergreening.53  
Article 27 also provides limited exceptions to the patentability of inventions. 
Under this article, countries may exclude inventions from patentability if doing 
so “is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal, or plant life. . . .”54  Article 27 further states that countries can exclude 
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatments of humans or 
animals, and genetically modified plants and animals.”55  These exceptions are 
limited so that countries cannot exclude inventions from patentability merely 
because the patentability of the products is prohibited under their law,56 
meaning that the presumption for patentability found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 
is also present under TRIPS. 
                                                                                                                  
 46 S. REP. NO. 114-1, at 1137 (2015). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See TRIPS, supra note 14. 
 49 See WIPO, supra note 2. 
 50 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27:1. 
 51 See id. art. 27:1 n.5.  
 52 See id. art. 33. 
 53 See Kilic, supra note 21, at 4. 
 54 See TRIPS, supra note 14¸ art. 27:2. 
 55 Id. art. 27:3. 
 56 Id. art. 27:2. 
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Another important provision in TRIPS is Article 31, which allows for the 
compulsory licensing of patented inventions.57  Through the compulsory 
licensing mechanism, individual countries can permit the production of generic 
pharmaceuticals.  To do so, the country must have made reasonable efforts to 
obtain authorization from the right holder.58  If the patent holder fails to 
address the request from the licensee within a reasonable time, the country can 
mandate that a license be granted, so long as the country will produce the 
product predominantly for the domestic market.59  However, if a country 
obtains a license under Article 31, the country must pay the patent holder 
“adequate remuneration in the circumstances.”60 
In 1994, the United States entered into NAFTA with Mexico and Canada.61  
This free trade agreement also addresses intellectual property concerns.  Article 
1709:1 of NAFTA provides that patents are available “for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that such 
inventions are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”62  NAFTA, like TRIPS, correlates “inventive step” with non-
obvious uses and “capable of industrial application” with useful.63  NAFTA also 
contains the same exclusions to patentability that are present in TRIPS, though 
NAFTA also permits the exclusion of biological processes for the creation of 
plants or animals.64  Furthermore, under NAFTA, like in the United States and 
under TRIPS, an invention is presumably eligible for a patent.65  
E.  RIGHTS CONFERRED TO PATENT HOLDERS UNDER TRIPS AND NAFTA 
The rights conferred upon patent holders under TRIPS and NAFTA are 
substantially similar.  Under TRIPS Article 28:1(a), a patented product cannot 
be made, used, offered for sale, sold, or imported without the patent holder’s 
consent.66  Additionally, under TRIPS Article 28:1(b), a patented process cannot 
                                                                                                                  
 57 Id. art. 31. 
 58 Id. art. 31(b). 
 59 Id. art. 31(b), (f). 
 60 Id. art. 31(h). 
 61 See NAFTA, supra note 9.  
 62 Id. art. 1709:1. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Compare TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27:2–3 (enumerating exceptions from patentability on 
moral grounds, for medical processes, and genetically modified organisms), with NAFTA, supra 
note 9, art. 1709:2–3 (enumerating exceptions from patentability on moral grounds, for medical 
processes, genetically modified organisms, and biological processes). 
 65 NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:1 (stating that “each Party shall make patents available” 
(emphasis added)). 
 66 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(a). 
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be used, offered for sale, sold, or imported without the patent holder’s 
consent.67  
Meanwhile, under NAFTA Article 1709:5(a), a patented product cannot be 
made, used, or sold without the patent holder’s consent.68  The only difference 
between the NAFTA provision regarding patented products and the 
corresponding TRIPS and United States provisions is that under NAFTA, 
offering a patented product for sale is not patent infringement unless the 
product is actually sold.69  Although, the United States requirement is stricter 
than the NAFTA requirements, the United States complies with NAFTA 
because NAFTA merely provides a minimum standard for patent protection.  
Finally, under NAFTA Article 1709:5(b), a patented process cannot be used, 
sold, or imported without the patent holder’s consent.70  Again, the restriction 
on offering a patented process for sale is absent under NAFTA while it is 
present under TRIPS and the United States provisions.71 
While differences exist between the NAFTA provisions and the United 
States and TRIPS provisions, these differences do not represent material 
differences among the schemes, as offering a product or process for sale is an 
element of actually selling the product.  Therefore, under NAFTA the act must 
be completed, while under TRIPS and the United States provisions, the act of 
selling does not need to be completed.  
F.  DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT PROVISIONS UNDER TRIPS AND 
NAFTA 
While both NAFTA and TRIPS provide a framework for minimum 
protections for patent holders, both treaties allow countries to institute policies 
which provide more extensive protection for patent rights.72  Additionally, both 
treaties provide that the signatory countries shall make the domestic civil courts 
available for any suit involving patent infringement.73  Under TRIPS and 
NAFTA, the civil courts have the authority to award the patent holder 
injunctive relief,74 compensatory damages,75 and reasonable attorney fees.76  
                                                                                                                  
 67 Id. art. 28:1(b). 
 68 See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:5(a). 
 69 Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(a); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 70 See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1709:5(b).  
 71 Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 28:1(b); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 72 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 1:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1702. 
 73 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 42; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(1).  
 74 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 44:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(c).  
 75 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:1; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(d). 
 76 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:2; NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(e). 
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Additionally, under NAFTA, a court may award compensation, including 
compensatory damages and attorney fees, to a party accused of infringement 
when the complaining party has abused the enforcement procedures.77  
However, the treaty does not define abuse of the enforcement procedures and 
the NAFTA dispute resolution body has not addressed the issue.  Therefore, it 
remains unclear under what circumstances a party accused of infringement 
under NAFTA can recover attorney fees or compensatory damages. 
G.  INTERPRETATION OF TRIPS PROVISIONS BY THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
BODY OF THE WTO 
While evaluating the NAFTA patent provisions is beneficial to examine the 
framework of international patent agreements, the agreement does not provide an 
effective avenue for interpretation of the agreement, as NAFTA disputes are 
settled through arbitration.78  However, TRIPS provides an effective instrument 
for interpretation of the treaty terms, as the agreement is subject to dispute 
resolution in the DSB of the WTO.79  However, since TRIPS was adopted in 
1994, the member countries have only brought nine cases before a DSB panel.80  
Of these nine panel cases, only four have dealt directly with the patent 
provisions.81  Furthermore, the India—Patents cases dealt with the 
implementation of TRIPS provisions when TRIPS came into effect, rendering 
these decisions obsolete in evaluating the regular TRIPS scheme, as India was 
granted certain concessions while implementing TRIPS.82  Meanwhile, the 
trademark dispute between the United States and China regarding Chinese 
censorship of trademarked materials best demonstrates how the DSB panels will 
                                                                                                                  
 77 See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1715(2)(f).  
 78 Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, NAFTA Secretariat, https://www.nafta-sec-alena. 
org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015).  
 79 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 64. 
 80 Marina Foltea, WTO Cases Involving TRIPS Agreement, Turin University (Nov. 18, 2013), http:// 
www.turin-ip.com/paste-editions/2013-edition/training-material-2013/Ms.%20Foltea/Lecture%20 
18nov13.pdf.  
 81 Dispute Settlement Cases in the Area of TRIPS (as of March 2015), World Trade Organization, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/6_tabledscases_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015). 
 82 Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patents]; Panel 
Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS79/3 (adopted Nov. 27, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patents II]. 
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apply TRIPS enforcement provisions.83  These panel and appellate body decisions 
highlight how the member countries and DSB interpret TRIPS provisions. 
While China—IPRs addresses the United States’ concerns about China’s 
censorship of trademarked material and how China disposes of censored 
material, the case provides analysis of TRIPS Article 41, which states that 
enforcement measures under TRIPS shall be made available under each 
member countries’ laws.84  The panel held that China’s policy did not allow 
countries whose goods violated the censorship provision an actual opportunity 
to gain relief for any violation.85  The panel reasoned that although China 
allowed countries to appeal any decisions regarding the rejection of a trademark 
to the Chinese courts, these appellate procedures failed to provide an effective 
opportunity for relief under TRIPS Articles 44, 45, 46, and 50.86  While the 
Appellate Body decided this case in the context of a dispute about trademarks, 
this interpretation of Article 41 should also apply to any dispute brought under 
the patent provisions of TRIPS. Therefore, under the patent provisions, 
countries must afford an effective opportunity for relief and effective appellate 
procedures. 
Additionally, in Canada-Patent Term, the Appellate Body interpreted Canada’s 
implementation of TRIPS Article 33, which requires members to provide a 
patent period of twenty years from the filing date.87  The appellate body held 
that Article 33 requires that each country, upon adopting TRIPS, should 
implement an effective patent period of at least twenty years from the filing 
date.88  This decision demonstrates the Appellate Body’s tendency to apply the 
plain meaning of TRIPS provisions.  
Finally, in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, the panel evaluated whether elements 
of Canada’s Patent Act fell under the general exceptions to TRIPS patent 
provisions found in TRIPS Article 30.89  The panel interpreted Article 27.1 to 
prohibit both de jure and de facto discrimination based on a product’s field of 
technology.90  However, the panel held that the European Community (EC) 
had not provided sufficient evidence that the stockpiling provision of Canada’s 
                                                                                                                  
 83 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China – IPRs]. 
 84 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 41. 
 85 See China – IPRs, supra note 83, ¶ 7.178. 
 86 See id. ¶ 7.179. 
 87 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 33. 
 88 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 85, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/AB/R 
(adopted Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Patent Term]. 
 89 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R 
(adopted Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents].  
 90 Id. ¶ 7.98. 
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Patent Act was a violation of TRIPS Article 27.1.91  Additionally, the panel 
highlighted that the EC had conceded that Canada’s Patent Act did not limit its 
actions solely to pharmaceutical products.92  Since the European Community, 
the complaining party, failed to prove their prima facie case, the panel found no 
violation of Article 30.  
These cases demonstrate that the DSB interpret TRIPS provisions narrowly.  
In these cases, with the exception of China—IPRs, the panels and appellate 
body strictly interpreted the terms of the treaty.  However, in China—IPRs the 
panel interpreted TRIPS Article 41 to require an effective avenue for relief in 
domestic courts, rather than just the possibility for relief.93  The panel’s 
interpretation of Article 41 represents a slight expansion of the TRIPS 
provisions. 
Finally, the lack of cases brought before the DSB under TRIPS94 
demonstrates either that member countries have largely brought their domestic 
regulations into conformance with TRIPS or that member countries are wary of 
bringing disputes under TRIPS lest they upset the delicate balance that prevails 
in international trade.  Despite the lack of complaints brought under TRIPS, the 
cases that have been brought under TRIPS demonstrate that countries either 
conform to the TRIPS provisions or other member countries will bring a 
complaint before the DSB for any gross deviations from the TRIPS provisions.  
H.  UNITED STATES TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
With the finalization of the TPP, the final terms of the treaty must be signed 
by the negotiating parties.  After the treaty is signed, the United States Congress 
must ratify the treaty. As with most trade agreements, the TPP will go through 
ratification as a congressional-executive agreement, which merely requires that 
both houses of Congress pass the implementing legislation rather than requiring 
two-thirds of the Senate voting to ratify the treaty.95  The United States 
Congress confirmed that the TPP would be subjected to the congressional-
executive agreement procedure, commonly referred to as “fast track” 
                                                                                                                  
 91 Id. ¶¶ 7.99–7.100. 
 92 Id. ¶ 7.95. 
 93 See China – IPRs, supra note 83, ¶ 7.165. 
 94 See Foltea, supra note 80, at 5 (showing that only 3% of all complaints filed in the WTO have 
been brought under TRIPS). 
 95 See Jane M. Smith et al., Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive 
Agreements Rather Than Treaties, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97 
-896.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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procedures, when both houses passed the Trade Promotion Authority Act 
(TPA) on June 24, 2015.96   
TPA provides guidelines for the negotiations of any trade agreement, 
including objectives for the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in the 
TPP.  Congress set out explicit objectives for the negotiation of intellectual 
property provisions, including that during negotiations, the executive branch 
should seek to “promote the adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights.”97  Congress reasoned that the most effective way to protect 
intellectual property rights was through the full implementation of TRIPS by all 
negotiating parties.98  This requirement would ensure that the intellectual 
property provisions of any trade agreement would reflect the standards in the 
United States and provide strong enforcement mechanisms against the 
infringement of intellectual property rights.99 
Furthermore, TPA states that if the executive branch fulfills the objectives 
set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 4201, then both houses of Congress will either adopt or 
reject the implementing legislation for the treaty without amendment.100  
However, 19 U.S.C. § 4205 provides other procedures that the executive branch 
must follow, such as publically releasing the final version of the agreement at 
least sixty days prior to entering into the agreement.101  These provisions ensure 
that Congress is well informed of the terms of the agreement prior to a vote on 
the implementing legislation.  These provisions are important because the 
implementing legislation of a congressional-executive agreement does not 
enumerate the provisions of the agreement; it merely states Congress’s decision 
to adopt the terms of the agreement.102   
Therefore, TPA ensures that Congress will either adopt or reject the final 
terms of the TPP with no amendments made to those terms during the 
ratification process.  The lack of amendments during the ratification process is 
important for the analysis of the TPP’s final terms. Since Congress cannot 
change the obligations the United States will incur if the treaty is adopted and 
ratified, the terms can be examined with certainty. 
                                                                                                                  
 96 Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, June 24, 2015, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/trade-pact-senate-vote-obama.html. 
 97 19 U.S.C. § 4201(b)(5) (2012). 
 98 Id. § 4201(b)(5)(A)(i)–(v).  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. § 4205(a)(1)(F). 
 101 Id. § 4205(a)(1)(B).  
 102 See, e.g., id. § 3311(a)(1) (stating that “Congress approves the North American Free Trade 
Agreement entered into on December 17, 1992”). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
On October 5, 2015, the negotiating countries agreed on the final draft of 
the TPP.103  However, since the agreement has not been signed, no country has 
an obligation to implement the final terms.104  However, the official release of 
the TPP provisions will allow the already vigorous public discourse regarding 
the desirability of the treaty to continue.  By analyzing the terms of the final 
Intellectual Property Chapter, as released by the United State Trade 
Representative (USTR), this Note will evaluate how these terms fit within the 
existing framework of patent provisions established through TRIPS and within 
the United States.  Additionally, these terms allow the analysis of the benefits 
that will accrue to the United States through the adoption of the TPP 
Intellectual Property Chapter. 
A.  FINAL TERMS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CHAPTER ON PRODUCT PATENTABILITY 
Many argue that the TPP would establish an intellectual property regime that 
is commonly referred to as a “TRIPS-plus Agreement,” meaning that the terms 
of the TPP will expand on the intellectual property provisions found in 
TRIPS.105  However, the final terms of the TPP show that the patentability 
provisions would not expand the TRIPS regime.  TPP Article 18.37 (1) 
provides that “each Party shall make patents available for any invention, 
whether a product or process, in all fields of technology, provided that the 
invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial 
application.”106  Footnote 30 to the agreement defines “an inventive step” and 
“capable of industrial application” as synonymous with “non-obvious” and 
“useful.”107  When comparing this provision with TRIPS Article 27, the two 
provisions are exactly the same.  Both provisions provide that a product is 
patentable if it is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial 
                                                                                                                  
 103 See Calmes, supra note 5. 
 104 Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/trade-pact-senate-vote-obama.html. 
 105 See, e.g., Trading Away Health: How the US’s Intellectual Property Demands for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement Threaten Access to Medicines, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (MSF) ACCESS 
CAMPAIGN, Aug. 2012, https://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Do 
cs/Access_Briefing_TPP_Eng_2012_update.pdf (arguing that TPP provisions would create a 
TRIPS-plus regime). 
 106 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(1). 
 107 See id. art. 30.  
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application.108  Additionally, the footnote to each provision defines “an 
inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” as synonymous with 
“non-obvious” and “useful.”109  Therefore, the terms of the TPP do not create 
additional obligations regarding the general patentability of products under 
TRIPS.  Furthermore, since the domestic U.S. patent provisions have already 
been brought into alignment with the TRIPS provisions, the TPP would not 
affect the patentability provisions found in 19 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.  Finally, since 
the TPP is silent regarding the patent period, the TRIPS patent period of 
twenty years will remain in effect.110 
While the general terms of patentability are the same under the TPP as those 
established by TRIPS, the TPP does further clarify the definition of a product’s 
usefulness.  Article 18.37(2) states that each member should make patents 
available for inventions which are “new uses of a known product, new methods 
of using a known product, or new processes of using a known product.”111  
Although this provision merely serves to clarify what constitutes an inventive 
step under the TPP, there is no equivalent provision in TRIPS, and the DSB 
has not had the opportunity to decide whether the TPP definition of an 
“inventive step” would also apply under TRIPS.  Therefore, this provision 
could represent a slight extension of TRIPS regarding what constitutes an 
inventive step. 
However, the additional provision in the TPP would not affect the domestic 
provisions in the United States.  In the United States, domestic law provides a 
presumption that a product is a novel concept.112  A product is deemed not to 
be novel, and therefore it is not patentable, only if a like product has already 
been patented, is described in a printed publication, or available for public 
use.113  Therefore, the TPP provision allowing for the patentability of any new 
use of an existing product would be permissible under the presumption of 
patentability present in the United States. 
                                                                                                                  
 108 Compare id. art. 18.37(1), with TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27. 
 109 TPP, supra note 6, n.30; TRIPS, supra note 14, n.5. 
 110 See TPP, supra note 6 (noting that the TPP Patent Provisions are silent regarding patent term 
lengths). 
 111 See id. art. 18.37(2). 
 112 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 113 Id. § 102(a).  
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B.  IMPORTANCE OF EXCEPTIONS TO PATENTABILITY UNDER THE TPP FOR 
ALLEVIATING CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH 
The TPP provides for the same general exceptions to patentability that can 
be found in TRIPS.  TPP Article 18.37(3) provides that a country may exclude 
products from patentability if it is necessary to protect public morality, to 
protect human, animal, or plant life.114  Additionally, each party can exclude 
diagnostic and surgical methods from patentability.115  Finally, under the TPP, a 
country can exclude microorganisms and biological processes from 
patentability.116  When comparing these general exceptions found in the TPP to 
those found in TRIPS Articles 27.2 and 27.3, each provision allows for the 
exclusion of the same products.117  Additionally, the TPP provides that the 
compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPS Article 31 still apply to the TPP 
patent provisions.118  Therefore, the general exceptions of the TPP do not limit 
the corresponding general exceptions found under TRIPS. 
These exceptions to the TPP serve to limit concerns that pharmaceutical 
companies will attempt to extend the patent period of essential medicines.119  
One of the major concerns regarding the TPP patent provisions is that the 
provisions will allow pharmaceutical companies to prevent the advent of 
generic drugs through the practice of “evergreening.”120  However, Article 18.37 
(3) provides that countries can refuse to grant a patent if doing so would be 
harmful to human life or health.121  Additionally, the TPP also invokes the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.122  The Doha 
Declaration recognized the gravity of public health problems and stated that 
TRIPS should be part of the international action taken to address these public 
health concerns.123  To do so, the declaration allows countries to use the 
exceptions in TRIPS to promote access to medicines.124  Furthermore, TPP 
Article 18.6 (1)(a) allows countries to invoke the Doha Declaration to protect 
                                                                                                                  
 114 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(3). 
 115 See id.  
 116 See id. art. 18.37(3)–(4). 
 117 Compare id., with TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 27:2–:3. 
 118 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.41 (stating that nothing in the TPP limits a Party’s rights under 
TRIPS Article 31). 
 119 See, e.g., Kilic, supra note 21. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.37(3).  
 122 See id. art. 18.50(3).  
 123 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference — Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 
14, 2001). 
 124 Id. ¶ 4. 
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public health without fear of violating the TPP.125  These provisions provide 
countries with the instruments necessary to combat “evergreening” and serve to 
alleviate concerns that the TPP patent provisions will endanger international 
public health initiatives, which rely on generic drugs. 
Additionally, Article 18.53, which defines a new pharmaceutical product as a 
chemical entity that has not been previously patented in the country,126 could 
possibly be used to further limit the patentability of medicines.  While this 
article references the pharmaceutical data protection provisions in Article 18.50, 
it is possible that this definition of a new pharmaceutical product could be used 
to prohibit evergreening. 
Regardless of the applicability of Article 18.53 to the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals, the TPP provides exceptions to patentability consistent with 
the exceptions in TRIPS.  Countries can use these exceptions to combat 
potential abuse of the domestic patent regime.  These exceptions serve to 
alleviate the concerns about the potential detrimental effect of the TPP on 
public health. 
C.  FINAL TERMS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON ENFORCEMENT OF 
PATENT PROVISIONS 
The TPP provides enforcement provisions similar to those found in TRIPS.  
TPP Article 18.71(1) provides that “[e]ach Party shall ensure that enforcement 
procedures as specified in this Section are available under its law so as to permit 
effective action against any act of infringement. . . .”127  This provision in the 
TPP corresponds with Article 41 of TRIPS, which provides that “[m]embers 
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement. . . .”128  The TPP provision regarding the obligation to implement 
a domestic scheme to enforce provisions of the agreement is exactly the same 
as the provision found in TRIPS. 
Since the TPP and TRIPS both create the obligation to create a domestic 
scheme to enforce the relevant provisions of the agreements, the relevant 
provisions must be evaluated to determine if the TPP creates additional 
obligations.  First, under TPP Article 18.74(1), the remedy for any infringement 
of a patent will lie in civil courts, not criminal courts.129  The civil remedy for 
                                                                                                                  
 125 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.6(1)(a).  
 126 See id. art. 18.53. 
 127 See id. art. 18.71(1). 
 128 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 41. 
 129 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(1). 
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patent infringement is also found in the United States domestic regime130 and 
TRIPS.131  
Second, the TPP states that compensatory damages must be available to the 
complaining party should they prevail over the infringing party.132  
Compensatory damages may include lost profits, fair market value of the 
infringed goods, or suggested retail price.133  TRIPS, like the TPP, allows for the 
recovery of compensatory damages when the complaining party prevails.134  
However, TRIPS does not explain which losses can be used to calculate 
compensatory damages.  The drafters of the TPP illustrate what constitutes 
compensatory damages while the TRIPS drafters fail to do so.  This additional 
clarity does create obligations beyond those found in TRIPS, as domestic courts 
are now restricted in how they can calculate compensatory damages.  
Additionally, these TPP provisions will restrict the calculation of compensatory 
damages for patent infringement in the United States, as the United States 
currently only provides a minimum amount for compensatory damages, 
equivalent to a reasonable royalty fee.135   
The TPP also permits domestic courts to grant injunctive relief to a 
complaining party, as long as such relief conforms to TRIPS Article 44.136  
Since this provision relies on TRIPS Article 44 to limit its applicability, this 
provision clearly adheres to the TRIPS enforcement provision regarding 
injunctive relief.  However, the TPP also states that should any party request a 
temporary injunction prior to litigation and abuse the relief, that party shall 
“provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation 
for the injury suffered. . . .”137  This provision is in place to prevent parties from 
frivolously requesting a preliminary injunction.  However, TRIPS has no such 
provision.138  Therefore, this provision creates a new obligation for the parties 
to the TPP.  Additionally, the United States does not have any such provision in 
the existing enforcement regime.139  Therefore, the United States will have to 
amend 19 U.S.C. § 283 to include provisions allowing a wrongfully enjoined 
party to recover against the complaining party. 
                                                                                                                  
 130 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). 
 131 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 42. 
 132 Id.  TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(3). 
 133 See id. art. 18.74(4). 
 134 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:1. 
 135 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 136 See TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(5). 
 137 See id. art. 18.74(15). 
 138 See TRIPS, supra note 14. 
 139 See 19 U.S.C. § 283. 
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Finally, the TPP dictates that each country should allow the prevailing party 
to recover their reasonable attorney fees.140  This provision is compatible with 
the TRIPS regime, which also allows the recovery of reasonable attorney fees.141  
Therefore, the TPP does not create a new obligation regarding the recovery of 
attorney fees.  Furthermore, this TPP provision does not necessitate a change 
to the United States domestic policy, as the United States already allows for the 
recovery of reasonable attorney fees.142 
D.  ECONOMIC BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
THE PATENT REGIME IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
The TPP intellectual property provisions represent a potential boom for the 
United States economy.  While many argue that the TPP will be harmful to the 
United States, these concerns do not address the benefits that will accrue to the 
United States under the intellectual property provisions.143  Instead, the 
concerns around the intellectual property provisions focus on the effects on 
public health in other countries, which are addressed earlier in this Note.  
Additionally, the United States stands to gain significant benefits from the 
implementation of the intellectual property provisions in the TPP. 
The United States economy relies on IP-intensive industries.  In 2010, IP-
intensive industries made up 34.8% of the United States’ Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), accounted for 60.7% of the United States’ merchandise 
exports, provided 18.8% of American jobs, and accounted for 19% of all 
United States private services exports in 2007.144  Patent-intensive industries 
alone made up 5.3% of the United States’ GDP and provided 2.7% of 
American jobs.145  Additionally, between 2010 and 2011, patent-intensive 
industries experienced a 2.3% growth rate, which outpaced the non-IP-intensive 
industries in the United States.146  The significant increase in patents granted 
between 2013 and 2014 further demonstrates the growth of patent-intensive 
                                                                                                                  
 140 TPP, supra note 6, art. 18.74(11). 
 141 See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 45:2. 
 142 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
 143 See, e.g., Richard Trumka, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Is a Bad Deal for American Workers, TIME 
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://time.com/4065267/trans-pacific-partnership-american-workers. 
 144 Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus, Economics and Statistics 
Administration and United States Patent and Trademark Office (Mar. 2012), http://www.uspto. 
gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
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industries within the United States.147  This economic data highlights the 
importance of IP-intensive industries within the United States economy. 
The importance of IP-intensive industries, specifically patent-intensive 
industries, demonstrates the possible impact of any changes to the intellectual 
property regime resulting from the TPP.  The TPP will serve to create uniform 
patent provisions in the twelve signing countries.  The importance of this 
uniformity cannot be understated.  The twelve parties to the TPP combine to 
make up nearly 40% of global GDP, providing an exceptionally large, uniform 
market for United States’ patent-intensive industries.148  Additionally, the 
United States will have to make no significant changes to the existing domestic 
regime to conform to the TPP.149  Meanwhile, countries that have not 
implemented effective intellectual property protection schemes will have to 
raise their domestic standards to conform to the TPP.150  The TPP implements 
these stringent intellectual property standards to promote innovation in patent-
intensive industries, benefitting those countries that have strong patent-
intensive industries, such as the United States.151 
By creating uniformity in the market and opening new markets to United 
States industries, the TPP will induce the patent-intensive industries within the 
United States to expand the exportation of their products, as the uncertainty 
costs inherent in a non-uniform system will no longer dissuade the exportation 
of products.  Additionally, the uniform provisions and intensive enforcement 
mechanisms in the TPP will prevent the distribution of infringing products, and 
producers within the United States will then increase exports to fill the resulting 
deficit in products. 
As detailed above, the TPP presents American patent-intensive industries 
with the opportunity to expand their growth.  As production of existing 
products increases and new products are invented, the patent-intensive 
industries will continue to increase their contribution to the United States’ GDP 
and the number of jobs these industries create within the United States.  
Through the implementation of the TPP, the United States will accrue benefits 
to domestic production and employment.  
                                                                                                                  
 147 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR 
YEARS 1963–2014 (2015) (indicating that patent grants increased from 302,948 in 2013 to 326,033 
in 2014, a 7.6% increase). 
 148 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 1. 
 149 Derek Scissors, Grading the Trans-Pacific Partnership, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Dec. 
9, 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads//2015/12/Grading-the-Trans-Pacific-Partne 
rship-on-trade. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
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E.  THE TPP IS DEAD.  LONG LIVE THE TPP 
During the 2016 campaign for President of the United States, free trade 
agreements took center stage in the discussion.  First, Democratic hopeful 
Bernie Sanders bemoaned the dangers of the TPP during the Democratic 
primary.152  Then, during the general election, Donald Trump began to echo 
some of Senator Sanders’s hostility toward free trade.  In June 2016, Donald 
Trump gave a speech in which he vowed to either renegotiate or withdraw from 
NAFTA and to withdraw from the TPP.153  However, Trump’s criticisms were 
focused more intently on convincing voters that free trade agreements were at 
fault for job loss in the United States,154 rather than any complaints about the 
form of modern trade agreements, which incorporate several different topics.  
However, with Donald Trump winning the election, it is unlikely that TPP will 
become law in the United States.155  Further demonstrating the likely demise of 
the TPP, several senators have announced that the TPP will not pass through 
the lame duck Congress before President Obama’s term ends.156   
Despite these setbacks towards the ratification of the TPP, the arguments 
made in this Note are still applicable.  It is unlikely that the template of modern 
trade treaties will change significantly because of Trump’s election.  The 
arguments regarding the economic benefits that would accrue to patent-
intensive industries will continue to foster a desire to protect domestic patent-
intensive industries during the negotiation of international trade agreements.  
Additionally, the loss of status in Southeast Asia and the possibility of China’s 
resurgence in the area could lead to the resuscitation of the TPP, as the United 
States will likely want to continue to check Chinese political and economic 
growth in the region.157 
                                                                                                                  
 152 See, e.g., Arnie Seipel, Sanders Centers Platform Fight on Trans-Pacific Trade Deal, NPR (July 3, 
2016, 12:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/03/484574128/sanders-centers-platform-fight-o 
n-trans-pacific-trade-deal. 
 153 Russell Berman, Trump’s Shockingly Specific Speech on Trade, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/Donald-trumps-shockingly-specific-speec 
h-on-trade/489194. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See Fact Check: Donald Trump’s First 100 Days Action Plan, NPR (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www. 
npr.org/2016/11/10/501597652/fact-check-donald-trumps-first-100-days-action-plan. 
 156 Elise Laboot & Nicole Gaouette, TPP defeat, future of US–Asian alliances sour Obama’s final trip 
(Nov. 14, 2016, 8:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/14/politics/tpp-trade-deal-trump-oba 
ma-trip. 
 157 Id.  See also Ian Talley, Trump’s Vow to Target China’s Currency Could be First Step to Trade War, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-pledge-to-
get-tough-on-china-raises-threat-of-trade-war-1478804077 (demonstrating that the Trump 
Administration will likely take a hard line on issues concerning the rise of China). 
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While the current climate lends an air of uncertainty to the future of trade 
agreements, it is unlikely that trade agreements will significantly change in the 
coming years.  Nations have been committed to liberalizing trade since the end 
of World War II, with the ratification of GATT 1947.158  Additionally, for the 
past twenty-five years, nations around the world have entered into agreements 
which combine traditional trade topics with other provisions, including 
intellectual property provisions.  It is unlikely that the current setback to the 
TPP will change the template that has developed in the past twenty-five years. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Since negotiations began on the TPP, the agreement has faced extensive 
criticism.  Many parties were concerned the agreement would significantly alter 
the international patent regime established in TRIPS.  However, the TPP does 
not materially alter the existing scheme for the patentability of products and 
patent enforcement.  Instead, the treaty merely clarifies ambiguous provisions in 
TRIPS, while United States domestic provisions will remain unchanged. 
Additionally, the TPP’s drafters took steps to alleviate the public health 
concerns surrounding the treaty by explicitly allowing for patent exceptions to 
protect human health and life.  The agreement will allow countries to reject 
product patents when granting the patent would threaten human health or life, 
either by invoking the exceptions in Article 18.37(3) or Article 18.50(3) and the 
Doha Declaration.  Additionally, the TPP allows countries to continue using the 
compulsory patent licensing scheme under TRIPS Article 31.  
Finally, the TPP will have minimal effect on the existing patent regime in the 
United States, as the domestic regime already conforms to the TRIPS 
agreement.  Yet the TPP will create a large, uniform international market, which 
approaches the rigorous patent standards found in the United States.  These 
raised standards will allow domestic patent-intensive industries to increase their 
exports.  Subsequently, these industries will continue to grow and increase 
domestic employment levels and GDP.  These benefits, combined with the 
alleviation of public health concerns, demonstrate that the TPP patent 
provisions will greatly benefit the United States.  
                                                                                                                  
 158  See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) Preamble, Oct. 30, 1947. 
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